DEF CON 32 - Open Sesame: how vulnerable is your stuff in electronic lockers -Dennis Giese, braelynn

The main goal of this talk is to highlight critical security vulnerabilities in electronic locker systems, particularly focusing on firmware exposure, weak authentication, and lack of encryption, which can allow attackers to extract user data, clone keys, and gain unauthorized access to lockers 2:15.

Key Takeaways:
• Locks like Digilock and SAG have weak security due to unencrypted firmware, unprotected eROMs, and lack of cryptographic protection, enabling easy extraction of PINs and RFID IDs 5:31.
• Physical attacks, such as accessing debug pins or motor wiring, are feasible due to poor design and lack of tamper switches, allowing bypasses without complex tools 9:00.
• A single manager key can grant access to all lockers in a system, enabling lateral movement and data theft, especially when PINs or RFID IDs are reused 12:20.
• The absence of secure boot, encryption, or secure storage means audit logs and user data can be tampered with or accessed directly 17:50.

Security in public locker systems is not robust—these devices are not designed for high-security use and are vulnerable to both physical and software attacks 36:16. Users should avoid reusing PINs across devices and treat locker PINs like passwords; the best defense is to use new, secure locks or avoid storing sensitive data in public lockers 37:49.

Sources:

• 2:15 Overview of reverse engineering and vulnerabilities in Digilock and SAG locks.
• 5:31 Discussion on unencrypted firmware and data exposure.